La macchina pensante e il pensiero educativo by Beshiri, Dilina & Puka, Edi
The thinking machine and the educational thought
La macchina pensante e il pensiero educativo
ABSTRACT
In this paper we will present the relationship that has always occurred between
people and technology, “the thinking machine”. Such relationship has become
so interlaced in our technologically advanced cultures, that technology is itself
considered as “the destiny of our time”. It is for this reason that in this paper we
will try to consider some theories concerning the construction of “intelligent
machines”, that is, referring to the typical peculiarities of the human thought.
This field’s theoretical starting point is strictly physical. The possibility to artifi-
cially reproduce intelligence is related to the study of the material of the cogni-
tive processes. The “revolution” that this prospective of study brings in all fields
of knowledge is connected to the need to initiate, master and to develop the
knowledge of the people-system as an indispensible precondition to whatever
realization of the system-machine.
On the one hand, we will analyze this idea from the point of view of information
processing, defined as Artificial Intelligence, while from the other side we will
analyze the cognitive processes of the people in order to obtain from the ma-
chine his/her own intelligent behaviors as well as enquire and study the cogni-
tive processes of the people so that we can artificially identify “the internal arti-
ficial architecture” by examining the effects of the cognitive development pro-
voked by the contact with the new technologies.
In questo articolo presenteremo il rapporto che da sempre si è verificato tra le
persone e la tecnologia, “la macchina pensante”. Tale rapporto è diventato così
intrecciato nelle nostre culture tecnologicamente avanzate, che la tecnologia è
di per sé considerata come “il destino del nostro tempo”. È per questo motivo
che in questo contributo si cercherà di considerare alcune teorie relative alla
costruzione di “macchine intelligenti”, facendo riferimento alle peculiarità
tipiche del pensiero umano.
Il punto di partenza teorico di questo campo è strettamente fisico. La possibilità
di riprodurre artificialmente intelligenza è legata allo studio del materiale dei
processi cognitivi. La “rivoluzione” che questo studio prospettico introduce in
tutti i campi della conoscenza è collegata alla necessità di avviare, master e
sviluppare la conoscenza del sistema-persona come condizione indispensabile
per qualunque realizzazione del sistema-macchina.
Da un lato, è necessario analizzare quest’idea dal punto di vista dell’elabo-
razione delle informazioni, definito come intelligenza artificiale, mentre, dall’al-
tro lato, vanno analizzati i processi cognitivi delle persone, al fine di ottenere
dalla macchina comportamenti intelligenti; è pertanto necessario informarsi e
studiare i processi cognitivi delle persone in modo da poter identificare artifi-
cialmente “l’architettura artificiale interna” esaminando gli effetti dello sviluppo
cognitivo provocato dal contatto con le nuove tecnologie.
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Introduction
In the summer of 1956 at the Dartmouth College of Hanover in the United Sta-
tes, took place the meeting of a group of mathematicians and logicians who pro-
posed to create programs capable of instructing computers to manipulate the
formal languages of logic, thus simulating the fundamental functions of human
intelligence and human behavior. These young scientists – including John
McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Herbert Simon and Allen Newell – defined the pro-
spects of a new discipline, called Artificial Intelligence by McCarthy himself. In a
few years it became the landmark in the general field of studies on human-ma-
chine relationships (Negrotti, 1990). At the conference, it was shown how machi-
nes can perform tasks whose solution is considered a sign of intelligence, such
as playing chess or proving theorems; in the same year another conference was
held in Boston, in which various scholars of different disciplines agreed to the
proposal of a model of the mind based on the postulation of internal processes
that elaborate symbols or information: this is the birth of “cognitive psychology”,
which lies at the basis of modern studies on artificial intelligence. In particular,
Human Information Processing (HIP) is the version of cognitivism that focuses
on the mind-computer analogy. Within this paradigm, the mind is conceived as
an entity that filters, selects, adjusts and transforms the data that come from the
outside and are processed through the operations of a computation (Bettelli,
2002). The first models of mental functioning in this area that were suggested in
the Sixties were characterized by a “serial” elaboration of information informa-
tion, characterized by drafting process, stages of selection and the final location
or output. Although having the merit of being very simple, such models display
a very limited capacity for the processing of information. Another area of rese-
arch that is critical to a comprehensive analysis of artificial intelligence is modern
connectionism: it argues that, in order to attain intelligent behavior, machine
should reproduce – or, at least, simulate – the functioning of brain at cellular le-
vel. Since brain consists of a number of neurons that varies between 10 and 100
billion, and each of them is connected to a variable number between 10 and
10,000 other neurons through synapses, according to connectionists it is neces-
sary to computationally reconstruct the dense network of connections that link
the neuronal cells in order to be able to create a truly thinking machine. Nowa-
days computers transistors, which were created only thirty years ago, are develo-
ping at a frightening rate. Given this evolution, it is estimated that by 2020 we will
be able to build a computer capable of exceeding the threshold of a million mips
(million instructions per second) and then compete in complexity with a human
brain. New computers will be built with massively parallel processors, capable of
emulating the connections of a biological brain, in addition to software that will
be programmed as an “expert system”.
1. Thinking machine: from cybernetics to artificial consciousness
The traditional analogy between man and machine thanks to the evolution of the
logical-mathematical sciences of the late Nineteenth century and the technolo-
gical advances of the early decades of the Twentieth century, has obtained the
extraordinary opportunity to engage scholars of different subject fields in one of
the biggest rushes ever known. In the Eighties, the metaphor of mind as a com-
puter (according to which the mind is a software and the brain is its hardware)
seems to lack much of the appeal acquired in previous decades. According to the
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advocates of a strong conception of AI, mind is just a computer program, but
their opinion cannot withstand the objections of those who claim that mind is
something more than the manipulation of formal symbols (Bailey, 1998). When
we think, the words that cross our minds are not simply non-interpreted formal
symbols: words have meaning, semantics. The sheer formal symbol of a compu-
ter program does not guarantee the presence of semantic content that is located
in real minds. The fact that human cognitive activities can be reharsed by a “thin-
king machine” and that the “riddle of the human mind” can be best understood
through the study of computer’s mechanisms and processes.
For this reason one question arises: can a machine ever become self-aware?
Computers are improving at an amazing rate, operating at ever faster proces-
sing speeds and with larger memories. Software is becoming more and more
complex and able to handle a vast array of tasks. But all said and done the final
outcome is still just a machine performing a prearranged task and it allegedly do-
es not come up with new ideas of its own or do any thinking.
Accordingly, in 1950, Alan Turing – “the father of artificial intelligence” – po-
sed a similar problem and, in order to determine whether a machine can be con-
sidered intelligent as humans, proposed a famous test, known as the Turing test.
The test is conceived as follows: an examiner is faced with two workstations, one
connected to a computer and the other connected with a human (Copeland,
2004; Petzold, 2008); the examiner then asks questions and observes the respon-
ses on the corresponding terminal. If, after a reasonable time, the examiner is
unable to determine who is the human being, then we say that the machine has
passed the Turing test. Currently, no computer is capable of passing the Turing
test, unless we restrict the interaction to a very specific sector, such as chess. The
problem of establishing the existence of an intelligent being provided with con-
sciousness and self-awareness is yet more complex. In fact, if intelligence is the
expression of an external behavior that can be measured by specific tests, self-
consciousness is the expression of an internal state of the brain that cannot be
measured.
2. The prospects for the future
The debate on the credibility of the brain-computer analogy highlights that kno-
wledge about the characteristics of human thought results from an investigation
of the relationship between mind and its physical counterpart – the brain (Frab-
boni, Pinto Minerva, 2009). Indeed this is an interesting conceptual leap, moving
from a science like physics that describes the events in closed systems, and joi-
ning together with cyber security, which describes them in the context of open
systems: information circulates and is enriched. In his book entitled Cognitive
Psychology, Neisser Urlic (1967) explains the existence of a trand which in fact
was already already very popular (Neisser, 1967). Cognitivism was defined as a li-
ne of research of the convergence of theoretical and experimental investigations
carried out in disciplines as diverse as experimental psychology, information
theory and cybernetics, linguistics, and neuroscience. Almost all researchers in
the Sixties and Seventies whose investigations bore on cognitive processes such
as information processing unit welcomed the the mind-computer analogy and,
because of that, little attention was paid to the influence of social, historical and
cultural cognitive development. In fact, in the second half of the Seventies, all
the principles of cognitive psychology were subjected to a critical review which
emphasized, inter alia, the need to study human mind under natural conditions,
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and not in the laboratory. In this framework, a highly original attempt to address
issues concerning the relationships between mind/brain/computer is the so-cal-
led “new cybernetics”, a research program undertaken to further investigate the
biological intelligence through computer simulations of experience-related
brain processes. Once abandoned as a model for studies of intelligent behavior,
new cybernetic’s connectionism changed radically in its perspective (Varela,
1997), so that cybernetics was revived in the Eighties after IT science acknowled-
ged that its models – particularly  the MT – were unable to progress beyond a cer-
tain point. Connectionists did note that MT was too distant from the “way” in
which the brain works. Brain performs analog operations and processes in paral-
lel, whereas computer does not work sequentially and performs analog opera-
tions. However, connectionism is not concerned with the functional architectu-
re of machines as manipulators of symbols, because they are primarily concer-
ned with the difficult task of reproducing intelligence’s alleged “neural net-
works” that mimicry natural processes of the brain. This is possible thanks to the
connection of different processors, highly interconnected and which hosts pro-
grams aimed to improve positive connections right at the expense of the wrong
ones, so as to achieve complex cognitive performance.
Conclusions
To conclude, we can say that it is possible to define human mind and determine
what characterizes intelligence, although there is still an ongoing debate, both
philosophical and scientific, about which mechanisms lead to the construction
of thoughts, memories and, thus, personal identity.
Networks’ increased ability to learn from experience and filter the noise of
complex interactions with living beings make the comparison of computers and
human mind very plausible. Philosophically speaking, the problem of connectio-
nism is that of not being able to constitute isomorphic relations as long as the
passage from neural functioning (connections) to higher mental processes is
concerned (Neisser, 1981). Instead, classical symbolic processors (MT) do the op-
posite because they explain higher mental processes but fail to establish functio-
nal isomorphism at the level of brain’s neurons. Human cognitive system, thus, is
conceived as a system characterized by a huge number of neurons that evolve;
its evolution is based of dynamic, complex and non-linear interactions, and it is
strongly affected by experiences that determine one subject’s learning when she
interacts with her environment.
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